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Wage Dispersion and Pension Funds: 
Financialisation of Non-Financial Corporations 
in the USA, 1966-2013 
 
by Ilhan Dögüs 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
It has already been pointed out in the literature on financialisation that private pension 
funds have played a key role in the inflation of financial markets. This paper argues that 
an increase in wage dispersion between white-collar and blue-collar workers affects 
pension funds in a direct and structural manner. Using Saez-Zucman and fred.stlouisfed 
annual datasets, the proposed argument is statistically analysed by applying Vector 
Autoregressive modelling for the period 1966-2013 in the USA. The results show that 
the responses of share of pension funds within US-household wealth to one-unit shock 
in wage dispersion are positive and significant over the first three years. Furthermore, 
wage dispersion explains 11% of variations in pension funds’ share in household 
wealth in the short-run and 19% of variations in the long-run. The study concludes that 
wage dispersion has a direct and structural impact on pension funds and contributes to 
the literature by clarifying the rise and expansion of pension funds. 
 
Keywords: financialisation, pension funds, wage dispersion, savings out of salaries, 
white-collar workers, capital market inflation 
JEL Classifications: J31, D14, E44 
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With a “stock-minded” public, as in the United States today, a rising stock-market may 
be an almost essential condition of a satisfactory propensity to consume; and this 
circumstance, generally overlooked until lately, obviously serves to aggravate still 
further the depressing effect of a decline in the marginal efficiency of capital. 
 (Keynes, 1960: 319) 
 
1. Introduction 
In Dögüs (2017a), I criticized the Financial Constraint Approach (FCA) to 
financialisation, which argues that investment and capital accumulation have fallen due 
to financial constraints that have been exacerbated by distributed profits, i.e. rising 
dividend and interest payments and buybacks (Hein, 2010); and I provided an 
alternative explanation that relies on the argument that Nonfinancial Corporations 
(NFCs) have prioritized reinvestment in financial assets over capital assets, since quasi-
rent expectations from capital assets have declined due to depressed demand. 
In order to underpin this argument, this paper deals with the inflation of financial 
markets. The aim is to understand how financial assets have become more profitable 
and thereby the “entrepreneur corporation” has become the “rentier corporation” 
(Toporowski, 1993: 42). The hypothesis to be tested is as follows. 
Pension funds
1
 have been affected by the increased wage dispersion between white-
collar workers (ancillary overhead labour) and blue-collar workers (production labour)
2
 
in a direct and structural manner
3
. 
The 0.97 correlation between wage dispersion and pension funds’ share in household 
wealth (see Figure 1) suggests that it needs to be tested whether or not there is a direct 
causality relationship between them. 
                                                 
1
 Keep in mind that I do not mean only private pension funds, discussion of which is very common in the 
literature. Private health insurance funds are also theoretically and empirically considered in this paper, 
since such funds are also being channeled to financial markets. 
2
 In Dögüs (2017b), I explained that the wage dispersion between white-collar and blue-collar workers in 
last five decades has also been driven by increased market concentration. My distinction between 
white-collar and blue-collar workers has nothing to do with the skill-level of workers, unlike that 
proposed by the Skill-Biased Technological Change approach. Rather, it is based on the tasks workers 
perform. The essential point is whether these tasks are ancillary, innovative tasks whose purpose is to 
increase the market share / market power of the firm (such as sales operations, advertising, marketing, 
design, R&D, business management, etc.) or tasks whose purpose is simply to produce goods and 
services. The white-collar/blue-collar distinction might appear confusing, since some jobs might 
correspond to white-collar jobs despite their having nothing to do with increasing market power. 
Nonetheless, it represents the option that can be most readily tackled by way of analysis of the available 
data. Calling innovative ancillary labour white-collar work and manual labour blue-collar work would 
not lead to crucial empirical and theoretical shortcomings, despite the existence of challenging 
examples such as cleaners, accountants, etc. See Blanchflower and Oswald (1990) for similar 
definitions and a similar distinction. 
3
 Other factors, such as institutional settings or an increase in the general income level, are outside the 
scope of this paper. I focus solely on the impact of wage dispersion as a sort of income inequality. See 
footnotes 14 and 16. 
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Figure 1: Wage differential (= ratio of salaries of ancillary workers to the wages of production 
workers), 1964-2015, USA (source: Own calculations based on https://fred.stlouisfed.org/) and 
Share of pension funds and insurance within household wealth, 1966-2013 (source: saezzucman.eu, 
Table A3) 
The argument relies on the assumptions that higher income earners have a higher 
propensity to save (Kaldor, 1955-1956: 95) and that savings from salaries of white-
collar workers are being channelled to financial markets through pension funds. It draws 
on the Capital Market Inflation Theory (hereafter CMIT) developed by Toporowski 
(2000), which highlights the relationship between financialisation
4
 and pension funds. 
Within the financialisation literature, CMIT is distinguished by the fact that it provides 
a comprehensive explanation of how pension funds have inflated the financial markets, 
of how financial markets operate, and also of why expectations of boosting investment 
by channelling long-term savings into financial markets via pension funds (Bonizzi and 
Churchill, 2016 and Toporowski, 2000: 51) might not be fulfilled. 
However, it does not adequately explain the background to the rise and expansion of 
pension funds. Drawing on Steindl (1952: 113-121 and 1990), Toporowski (2008b: 10 
and 2000: 49) very briefly mentions the role of middle class savings. He does not, 
however, elaborate upon the topic in detail. This paper strives to provide an explanation 
of the rise of pension funds via the savings from the salaries of white-collar workers 
                                                 
4
 “Financialisation is broadly defined as the inflation of capital markets” (Toporowski, 2008b: 1). I prefer 
to define it as “the recourse of previously nonfinancial corporations to the use of financial methods and 
instruments” (Dögüs, 2017a).  
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(i.e. “professionals and big salary earners”, ibid., 115) that have been made possible by 
the increase in the wage gap
5
. 
In the literature, it has been mostly suggested that the emergence of private pension 
funds is a product of neoliberal institutional arrangements that delegate social welfare to 
financial markets
6
. To my knowledge, there are no studies that explain the rise of 
pension funds in economic terms and by its relationship to wage dispersion. Simlarly, 
the impact of wage dispersion on financialisation has yet to be discussed, except in 
Fontana et al. (2016), Herr and Ruoff (2014) and Dünhaupt (2014). However, the latter 
argue that financialisation leads to wage dispersion between financial sector workers 
and non-financial sector workers, as well as between executive and non-executive 
compensation. Darcillon (2012) shows that, besides labour market deregulation, 
financial liberalization also amplifies wage inequality. My argument does not deal with 
the wage differential between financial and non-financial workers and proposes the 
opposite direction of causality: Wage dispersion between white-collar workers and blue-
collar workers (which has been driven by increased market concentration) has led to 
financialisation of NCFs via private pension funds. It is this reversal of the direction of 
causality that represents the paper’s original contribution to the literature. 
Palley (2015) takes composition into account by distinguishing the different wage levels 
of top managers, middle managers and manual workers. But he does not connect the 
matter to financialisation and the channeling of savings towards financial markets. 
The paper is structured as follows. After a brief review of the CMIT with respect to the 
relationship between pension funds and the financialisation of NFCs, section three 
provides a modest explanation of the relationship between pension funds, on the one 
hand, and wage dispersion between white-collar and blue-collar workers, on the other. 
Chapter four tests the hypothesis by way of a Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model 
using US annual data for the period between 1966 and 2013. The final chapter 
concludes. 
2. Pension Funds and Financialisation: Capital Market Inflation Theory 
The relationship between financialisation and pension funds has already been widely 
discussed and examined in the literature by way of empirical studies
7
. It has been 
argued that the inauguration of private pension schemes in the 1970s led capital markets 
to inflate (Toporowski, 2000: 50; Bonizzi, 2015: 124; Guðmundsson, 2016: 297) and 
financialisation to emerge (Lazonick and O'Sullivan, 2000), since during this decade, 
“the majority of stocks and shares” started to be “owned by pension funds and 
insurance companies” (Toporowski, 2014: 104). McCarthy et al. (2016: 755-756) 
reports that after the 1970s, the asset allocation of pension funds in the USA underwent 
a tremendous shift towards corporate equities. Figure 2 shows that since 1980, the share 
of pension funds in household financial wealth has increased. In addition, Figure A6 of 
                                                 
5
 It could be argued that income and savings of capitalists should have been considered too. However, the 
number, income and savings of capitalists have not experienced a sharp shift, as is the case for white-
collar workers, and hence do not demarcate a structural break. Wage dispersion between white-collar 
and blue-collar workers underwent a structural break in 1980. See Table 7 for test result. In addition, 
capitalist savings have been left out for the sake of simplicity. 
6
 See Bonizzi, (2017: 22), Toporowski (2008b:13), Dixon (2008), and Ganßmann (2013). 
7
 See McCarthy et al. (2016), Guðmundsson (2016), Dixon (2008), Dixon and Sorsa (2009), Bonizzi 
(2015), Engelen (2003), Ganßmann (2013), and Toporowski (2000). 
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saezzucman.eu shows that the share of profits and interest paid to pensions within 
capital income in the United States has continuously increased since 1970. In 2014, 
49.3% of pension funds invested in stocks and the value of pension funds represented 
96% of GDP
8
. This confirms that pension funds have functioned to inflate financial 
markets: The ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP for the United States has 
increased from 41,3% in 1980 to 146,2% in 2014
9
. 
It is worth recalling that “collective public pension schemes”, like in Germany, might 
serve to sustain the consumption of elderly retirees, since their retirement benefits are 
paid by the contributions of people who are currently working. But private pension 
schemes, by contrast, serve to inflate financial markets. 
 
Figure 2: The composition of household wealth in the US as a share of GDP, 1913-2013. Source: 
saezzucman.eu – Main Data Figure 2 
Toporowski points out that the excess inflow into financial markets, “which is made up 
of the contributions to pension funds, plus the investment income which is not paid out 
as pensions” (Toporowski, 2000: 69), inflates the prices of financial assets (ibid., 75). 
Thereby it stimulates the demand for financial assets by increasing the expected capital 
gains from them (Toporowski, 2008b: 8), as “changes in profits and trends in stock 
prices attract savings from other nonfinancial securities markets, such as bank deposits, 
gold and property, which also act as repositories for savings” (Toporowski, 2000: 32). 
This renders NFCs overcapitalized, by encouraging them to refinance “in excess of their 
current needs” (Toporowski, 1993: 29). 
                                                 
8
 https://www.oecd.org/finance/Pension-funds-pre-data-2015.pdf 
9
 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DDDM01USA156NWDB 
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Toporowski defines excess capital – which “has been used to replace bank borrowing 
with cheaper long-term capital”10 or “to buy short-term financial assets” (Toporowski, 
2008b: 9) – as the “excess of liabilities held in financial assets over productive capital, 
i.e., the plant, equipment, materials, and stocks of unsold products and semi-fabricates 
(ibid., Chapter 3 and Toporowski, 2008a: 4). For the sake of greater clarity, I would 
prefer to define it as the quantitative difference between capital (in terms of accounting, 
owners’ equity) and nonfinancial assets corresponding to the quantitative difference 
between financial assets and financial liabilities. In other words, it is the capital not 
employed for real investment, but rather for financial operations: “for managing the 
liquidity” (ibid., 7) “in search for speculative returns” (ibid., 6) in “inflated highly 
liquid financial markets” (ibid., 4). 
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Figure 3: Share of pension funds within household wealth, USA, 1966-2013, Source: 
saezzucman.eu Table A2; and Financialisation Index (= Ratio of financial assets to non-financial 
assets held by US-NFCs.), 1965-2014, Source: own calculation based on research.stlouisfed.org/. 
Concerning the financialisation of NFCs (i.e. their preferring to hold liquid financial 
assets over non-financial assets) due to capital market inflation, Toporowski states that 
“capital market inflation has adverse consequences for listed companies and the 
economy as a whole because the resulting excessive gearing discourages investment” in 
real capital assets (Toporowski, 2000: 46)
11
. Concerning the decrease in investment due 
                                                 
10
 Since the increasing prices of securities reduces interest and dividends and hence makes the issuance of 
stocks cheaper and more attractive (Toporowski, 2000: 50). However, the reduction in this market yield 
is offset by the additional return on capital gains that such inflation introduces into the capital market 
(ibid., 28). 
11
 Whether the ability of firms to hedge their illiquid real investments with liquid assets might make real 
investment easier is debatable and calls for further research, since the main drivers of investment are 
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to savings out of the salaries of white-collar workers that flow into financial markets
12
, 
the following statement by Minsky, similar observations by Steindl (1952: 113-121), is 
useful: 
a high savings ratio out of wages diminishes and a low ratio increases business 
profits: the behaviour of saving out of wages amplifies the effect on profits of 
increases and decreases in investment. (Minsky, 1986: 171) 
By way of this process – namely, overcapitalization – the “entrepreneur corporation” 
has become the “rentier corporation” (Toporowski, 1993: 36-43) with “a higher 
liquidity preference” (ibid, 42). Due to higher liquidity preference, the ratio of liquid 
financial assets to non-financial assets held by US-NFCs has increased in the last three 
decades (see Figure 3). This development has mainly been driven by depressed demand 
for consumption goods (Dögüs, 2017a). In line with accounting principles, the higher 
ratio of financial assets to non-financial assets corresponds to an increase in excess 
capital (ibid, 23-24). 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that large NFCs have “access to capital markets” and 
“can afford to issue securities to replenish their liquid reserves” (Toporowski, 2000: 
56). Not surprisingly, they have excess capital and engage more in financial 
operations
13, i.e. “balance sheet restructuring” (Toporowski, 2008b: 9). By way of an 
empirical investigation of NFCs in the USA between 1971 and 2011, Davis (2013) 
found that mostly large NFCs have engaged in financial transactions.  
3. Wage Dispersion and Pensions Funds 
In this section, I do not explain the factors behind changes in savings (of white-collar 
workers): such as inflation, real interest rate, changes in income level (Keynes, 1960), 
income distribution, institutional arrangements, expectations, future or past income, etc. 
These have already been discussed in the relevant literature. I merely focus on the 
impact that a relative increase in the income and share in employment composition of 
white-collar workers has on the pension savings that are channelled to financial markets 
via private pension funds. The reasons why I do not prefer to focus on the impact of an 
increase in general income on pension savings are as follows: (i) It is not the increase in 
general income level, but wage dispersion that has been one of the distinguishing 
features of the last decades
14
; (ii) Pension savings do not simply correspond to ordinary 
                                                                                                                                               
the expected profits sustained by aggregate demand. To put it differently, if firms perceive that real 
investment would generate higher profits due to strong demand, then they might borrow or sell their 
financial assets, in order to finance investment in excess of internal funds (Minsky, 1986: 213). If non-
financial assets increase due to real investment, then either financial liabilities increase (due to 
borrowing) or financial assets decrease (since they have been sold). If owner equity has not increased 
by the same amount, excess capital decreases as a result. After all, by definition excess capital is capital 
that is not employed for the acquisition of non-financial assets, but rather for the management and 
acquisition of financial assets. 
12
 For the sake of simplicity, the savings invested in housing and real estate have been left out of the 
analysis. See footnote 15. 
13
 See Dögüs (2017a) for a critique of the FCA, since it does not consider the role of firm size in the 
financialisation of NFCs. 
14
 If (wage) inequality had not increased after 1980, the savings of high-income earners might not have 
been stimulated so much, due to higher price levels that were caused both by an increase in labour costs 
and by a consumption cascade that would be driven by the increase in income, especially, of low 
income-earning blue-collar workers who have a lower propensity to save. This represents the opposite 
of debt-deflation. In this sense, Herr and Ruoff (2014) assert that “the  living  standard  of  the  middle  
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“non-spending savings” or, so to say, “residual”, but rather they are induced by capital 
gains expectations
15
; (iii) As the rise in inequality indicates, the real income of lower-
income earners, among them blue-collar workers, has declined or at least stagnated and 
hence they are not able to save, whereas high-income earners, among them white-collar 
workers, have earned more
16
. 
I first show that the wages (income) and savings of white-collar workers are higher and 
have increased
17
 and then that the coverage rates for pension funds and health insurance, 
both of which inflate capital markets, is higher for white-collar workers. 
Figure 4 shows that college-graduates (who are mostly employed as white-collar 
workers
18
) have a higher propensity to save than high-school graduates (blue-collar 
workers), since they earn more (see Figure 1). 
                                                                                                                                               
class,  including skilled  workers  will be slightly  negatively affected by  the  increase  of  wages in the  
low-wage sector,  whereas the  living standard  of the  workers  earning low  wages  will  increase” 
(Herr and Ruoff, 2014: 35-36). For example, Cynamon and Fazzari (2013: 8) show that the demand of 
the top 5% of income-earners had a negative trend during the period 1989-2009. 
15
 Capital gains are mostly used for “extraordinary liabilities for health care, holidays, school fees, the 
purchase of housing, or the repayment of inconvenient debt” (Toporowski, 2010). My calculations 
based on the Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES: http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxstnd.htm#2011) for the 
period from 1984 to 2011 support this argumentation: The share of expenditures for personal insurance 
and pensions, owned dwelling, mortgage, and education in white-collar workers’ expenditures is higher 
by around 3% than the share for the same items in blue-collar workers’ expenditures. The relationship 
between the consumption pattern of white-collar workers and market concentration calls for further 
research. 
16
 Elucidation of the relationship between savings and income distribution requires further research based 
on “Duesenberry’s and Veblen’s ideas on relative consumption and conspicuous consumption” (Palley, 
2008:3). Green (1991), Wildauer (2016), Nikiforos (2016), Perugini et. al. (2016), and Cynamon and 
Fazzari (2013) are some of the studies dealing with the relationship between income distribution and 
savings. 
17
 Despite stability or an increase in the savings of white-collar workers, total savings have decreased (see 
https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/PSAVERT), since low-income earners whose savings have fallen 
(increased debt due to a fall in their real income) constitute the majority of society. 
18
 In 2011, underemployment of college graduates (i.e. their employment in jobs that do not require 
college degrees) was around 28%. (See stateofworkingamerica.org, Figure 4AK.) 
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Figure 4: Average saving ratios (=1-real consumption expenditure/real income after taxes) of white-
collar and blue-collar workers; USA, 1995-2011. Source: Own calculation based on the Consumer 
Expenditure Survey (CES) (http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxstnd.htm#2011) 
If we consider Figure 4 in light of the fact that the share of college graduates in 
employment composition has increased from 14,7% in 1973 to 36,3% in 2016
19
, then 
we can infer that the total savings out of the salaries of white-collar workers must have 
tremendously increased, due to both the rise in the employment share of white-collar 
workers and increased wage dispersion. Figure 5 makes this especially clear.  
                                                 
19
 See http://www.epi.org/data/#?preset=wage-education 
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Figure 5: Average saving ratio (1- real consumption expenditure/real income after taxes) and 
employment share of white-collar workers (managers and professionals); USA, 1984-2011. Source: 
Own calculation based on the CES (http://www.bls.gov/cex/csxstnd.htm#2011) 
The increase in the employment share and savings ratio of white-collar workers from 
1984 to 2011 accounts for 35% of the total fall in real consumption expenditure by all 
wage and salary earners. To put it differently, if the employment share and savings ratio 
of white-collar workers were the same in 2011 as in 1984, then the total real 
consumption expenditure of workers would be 35% higher. As Minsky points out, this 
amount of total savings out of the salaries of white-collar workers that has not flowed 
into goods markets, but rather into financial markets, depresses demand and discourages 
real investment: 
 The greater the income of the managerial, technical, and professional labor 
force -and the greater their savings - the lower the cash flows [internal funds] 
available for capitalist and rentier income. (Minsky, 1986: 175) 
The inflows of these augmented savings into financial markets have mainly occurred by 
way of private pension funds. Green (1991) emphasizes that the introduction of private 
pension funds had a role in raising the savings of high income-earners as “contractual 
savings” (Toporowski, 2000: 49). Excess inflow into financial markets by way of 
pension and health insurance funds depends on the fact that, once the contract has been 
concluded, a certain amount is periodically withdrawn from the bank account of the 
holder and, as long as the contract is not cancelled prior to retirement, the capital gains 
from the previous period are reinvested. This means that the fixed, quasi-compulsory 
rate of savings due to pension fund contracts do not fluctuate and are already integrated 
into financial markets. In addition, it indicates that pension savings that have flowed 
into financial markets feed back upon themselves, being affected, namely, by their 
lagged values. 
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As a proxy, Figure 6 supports the assumption that white-collar workers constitute the 
greater part of private pension plan and insurance plan holders
20
. It should be noted that 
even if both groups of workers had the same coverage rate, white-collar workers would 
have still been able to contribute a higher amount to pension funds, and hence to 
inflation in financial markets, due to the wage inequality between them. Skott 
underscores this point as follows: 
The poor have few financial assets and their portfolio is skewed towards fixed-
income assets. The rich, by contrast, hold a large proportion of their wealth in 
stocks. Thus, an increase in inequality tends to raise the demand for stocks. 
(Skott, 2011: 2) 
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Figure 6: Share of blue-collar and white-collar workers who received health insurance from their 
own job for which their employer paid for at least some of their health insurance coverage and who 
are included in an employer-provided plan for which the employer paid for at least some of their 
pension coverage. Source: http://www.epi.org/data/#?subject=healthcov&e=* and 
http://www.epi.org/data/#?subject=pensioncov&e=*  
                                                 
20
 The declining trend does not matter, since the graph shows the provision rate by employers. More 
importantly, the main point that the figure illustrates is that more white-collar workers participate in 
private pension and health insurance funds than blue-collar workers. Declining provision of the 
employers’ contribution and a rising trend in the volume of pension and health insurance funds 
indicates that employees are contributing by way of their own net salary. 
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In this section, I showed that the employment share and savings of white-collar workers 
have increased and that they have more pension plan and health insurance coverage than 
blue-collar workers. The following section deals with the empirical testing of the 
hypothesis. 
4. Empirical Evidence 
This section deals with the empirical testing of the main argument that rising wage 
dispersion between white-collar and blue-collar workers has led to the rise and 
expansion of pension funds. The testing is carried out by way of US annual data for the 
period between 1966 and 2013
21
. The reason for using the 49-year time span and 
examining macro data is to demonstrate and to capture this long-run structural tendency 
during the recent decades in which the dramatic changes in question have taken place. 
4.1.  Data Description and the Model 
As the main argument of the paper is that there is a structural and direct causal 
relationship between pension funds and wage dispersion, a VAR model with impulse 
response function and variance decomposition analysis is one of the best options for 
examining such an argument
22. In VAR modelling, “each endogenous variable is 
assumed to depend on lagged values of itself and of all other endogenous variables” 
(Dées and Güntner, 2016: 5). Such an assumption is appropriate both for pension funds 
and wage dispersion, since, as pointed out above, they feed back upon themselves,. The 
non-stationarity of variables (see Table 1 in the appendix) confirms that both variables 
are being affected by their lagged values. 
As this paper deals merely with the causality running from wage dispersion to pension 
funds, the flipside of the relationship (i.e. causality running from pension funds to wage 
dispersion) is neglected and left for further research – this despite the fact that VAR 
modelling assumes that the relationship is bi-directional. 
The impulse response function reveals whether the causality between variables is direct 
or not and variance decomposition analysis “provides valuable supplementary 
information about the interlinkages among the variables in the model” (Greenwood-
Nimmo and Tarassow, 2013: 12). Both analyses provide structural clarification of how 
strong and how long-lasting the effects are. Moreover, the impulse response function 
has an advantage inasmuch as it reveals that the power of the effects is not stable, but 
rather might fluctuate and might even turn in the opposite direction (from positive to 
negative and vice-versa) after a certain time. 
Tarassow (2010) describes what is being analysed by way of the impulse response 
function and variance decomposition as follows: 
…impulse-response function which computes the propagation over time of a 
shock on the variable of interest. The variance decomposition analyzes the 
                                                 
21
 The relationship between financialisation and pension funds will not be tested, since this relationship 
has already been noted and examined in the financialisation literature. 
22
 As to why I do not opt for any endogenous or exogenous control variable in the model, it is due to the 
fact that what is being tested is merely whether the causality is direct or not. 
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relative impact of a shock in one variable on the total variance of the variable of 
interest – it measures the relative impact of a structural shock for the 
explanation of the total variance of the dependent variable. (Tarassow, 2010: 
14-15). 
As I am directly dealing with the dispersion between wages of production workers 
(blue-collar workers) and salaries of overhead ancillary labour (white-collar workers), I 
employ the ratio of average hourly wages of non-production (overhead) workers to 
average hourly wages of production workers to measure the wage differential at the 
macro level. 
The wage differential (wd) as the ratio of the salaries of ancillary white-collar non-
production workers to the wages of blue-collar production workers is calculated as 
follows: 
 
Equation 1: Wage Differential 
In the equation, c stands for compensation of all employees
23
, h for total worked 
hours
24
, and p for the annual average hourly wages paid to production workers
25
. The 
numerator gives the average hourly wages paid to ancillary (overhead) non-production 
employees: namely, white-collar workers.  
The share of pension funds in household wealth is calculated as the ratio of the total 
value of pension funds held by US households to their total financial wealth. The data 
was retrieved from Table A3 of saezzucman.eu. The reason why it is preferable to 
employ pension funds’ share in household wealth in the model, instead of total 
liabilities of private pension fund institutions in the market, is to show whether the 
pension savings channeled into markets have realized gains and validated themselves
26
. 
As the variables have either non-stationarity or trend and have no co-integration 
problem, I employ their log differences and run an unrestricted Vector Autoregressive 
Model with E-Views 8. AIC (Akaike Information Criterion) suggests a 4-period lag 
length. The LM Autocorrelation test results also indicate that the model has no 
autocorrelation problem. The model has also no stability problem, according to the 
Inverse Roots of the AR Characteristic Polynomial. (See the appendix for all test 
results). 
 
 
Equation 2: VAR(4) Model Equation 
                                                 
23
 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A576RC1 
24
 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/TOTLQ 
25
 https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/AHETPI and https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/A132RC1 
26
 Since the available dataset was not decomposed, I did not have the possibility of extracting capitalists’ 
share from households. But I do not expect that this would lead to any empirical or theoretical 
shortcomings, since “pension savings are deferred wage” (Engelen, 2003: 1364). 
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In the equations, stands for pension funds’ share in household wealth and  stands 
for wage dispersion between white-collar and blue-collar workers. 
4.2.  Results 
The analysis of the impulse response function results shown in Figure 7 is as follows
27
: 
The responses of pension funds’ share in household wealth to wage dispersion are 
positive and significant over the first 3 periods and thereafter become insignificant. This 
result does not falsify and strongly supports the main argument of this paper that 
pension funds have a direct causal relationship with wage dispersion. 
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Figure 7: Impulse Response Function Results
28
 for the period 1966-2013 
In the short term, 11% of the variations in pension funds’ share in household wealth are 
due to wage dispersion (see Figure 8) and this figure reaches 19% in the fifth period. 
The fact that around 20% of long-term variations are explained by wage dispersion 
confirms that the relationship is one of structural causality
29
. 
                                                 
27
 See Table 5 in the appendices for the values. 
28
 The IRF-figures represent the accumulated responses, since the growth rates (log differences) of the 
variable are employed in the model. Secondly, accumulated responses indicate that the shocks create a 
path: i.e. that the responses are not temporary. The dotted lines represent the standard errors, i.e. the 
95% significance level. If both of the dotted lines are not in the same area (i.e. if one is above and the 
other is under the 0 (zero), then the responses are not significant. In this case, one period represents one 
year, since the data is annual. 
29
 See Table 6 in the appendices for the values. 
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Figure 8: Variance Decomposition Analysis Results for the period 1966-2013 
5. Conclusion 
I have argued that the pension funds that have inflated financial markets are affected in 
a direct and structural manner by rising wage dispersion between white-collar and blue-
collar workers, since higher income enables white-collar workers to save more. 
The VAR Model analysis results show that the hypothesis has not been falsified at an at 
least 95% confidence level. 
The findings show that the responses of the share of pension funds in US-household 
wealth to one-unit shock in wage dispersion are positive and significant over the first 3 
years. Furthermore, 11% of variations in pension funds’ share in household wealth are 
explained by wage dispersion in the short-run and 19% of variations are explained by 
wage dispersion in the long-run  
We can thus conclude that the inflation of financial markets by pension funds, which 
has contributed to the financialisation of NFCs, depends, first and foremost, on 
increased wage dispersion between white-collar and blue-collar workers. 
Comparison to other countries – for example, Finland or the Netherlands (McCarthy et 
al, 2016) – which have experienced wage dispersion, but only a limited expansion of 
pension funds and financialisation (or vice-versa), calls for further research. 
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APPENDICES: TEST RESULTS 
 
 
Table 1: Unit Root Test Results  
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Table 2: Johansen System Co-integration Test Results 
 
Table 3: Serial Correlation Test Results  
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Figure 9: Inverse Roots of AR Characteristic Polynomial 
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Table 4: Lag Order Selection Criteria 
 
 
Table 5: Impulse Response Function 
 
Table 6: Variance Decomposition 
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Table 7: Structural-Break Test: Wage Dispersion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
